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Abstract
EMV, also known as “Chip and PIN”, is the leading system for card payments world-
wide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced
in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentica-
tion protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate
a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We
have discovered that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or
home-grown algorithms to supply this number. This exposes them to a “pre-play” attack
which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to
the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card phys-
ically (in the sense of extracting the key material and loading it into another card). Card
cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we
detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the
weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implemen-
tation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest
manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in
which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned
and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. Pre-
play attacks may also be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a
man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and im-
plementation mistakes that enabled the flaw to evade detection until now: shortcomings of
the EMV specification, of the EMV kernel certification process, of implementation testing,
formal analysis, or monitoring customer complaints. Finally we discuss countermeasures.
1 The Smoking Gun
EMV is now the leading scheme worldwide for debit and credit card payments, as well as for
cash withdrawals at ATMs, with more than 1.34 billion cards in use worldwide. US banks were
late adopters, but are now in starting to issue EMV cards to their customers. EMV cards
contain a smart card chip, and are more difficult to clone than the magnetic-strip cards that
preceded them.
EMV was rolled out in Europe over the last ten years, with the UK being one of the early
adopters (from 2003–5). After it was deployed, the banks started to be more aggressive towards
customers who complained of fraud, and a cycle established itself. Victims would be denied
compensation; they would Google for technical information on card fraud, and find one or other
of the academic groups with research papers on the subject; the researchers would look into
their case history; and quite often a new vulnerability would be discovered.
The case which kicked off the research we report here was that of a Mr Gambin, a Maltese
customer of HSBC who was refused a refund for a series of transactions that were billed to his
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card and which HSBC claimed must have been made with his card and PIN at an ATM in
Palma, Majorca on the 29th June 2011. In such cases we advise the fraud victim to demand
the transaction logs from the bank. In many cases the banks refuse, or even delete logs during
the dispute process, leaving customers to argue about generalities. Some courts have recently
criticised banks for this and in the Gambin case the bank produced detailed log data. We
observed that one of the fields on the log file, the “unpredictable number” or UN, appeared to
be increasing steadily:
Date Time UN
2011-06-29 10:37:24 F1246E04
2011-06-29 10:37:59 F1241354
2011-06-29 10:38:34 F1244328
2011-06-29 10:39:08 F1247348
The UN appears to consist of a 17 bit fixed value and the low 15 bits are simply a counter
that is incremented every few milliseconds, cycling every three minutes.
We wondered whether, if the “unpredictable number” generated by an ATM is in fact
predictable, this might create the opportunity for an attack in which a criminal with temporary
access to a card (say, in a Mafia-owned shop) can compute the authorisation codes needed to
draw cash from that ATM at some time in the future for which the value of the UN can be
predicted. We term this scenario the “pre-play” attack.
We discovered that several ATMs generate poor random numbers, and that attacks are
indeed possible. Following our responsible disclosure policy, we informed bank industry organi-
sations in early 2012 so that ATM software can be patched. We are now publishing the results
of our research so that customers whose claims for refund have been wrongly denied have the
evidence to pursue them, and so that the crypto, security and bank regulation communities can
learn the lessons. These are considerable. For engineers, it is fascinating to unravel why such a
major failure could have been introduced, how it could have persisted undiscovered for so long,
and what this has to tell us about assurance. At the scientific level, it has lessons to teach
about the nature of revocation in cryptographic protocols, the limits of formal verification, and
the interplay between protocol design and security economics.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give the high-level background,
telling the history of EMV and discussing its effect on fraud figures overall. In Section 3 we
give the technical background, describing how an EMV transaction works. Section 4 describes
our experimental methods and results: how we developed a data capture card to harvest UN
sequences from ATMs, and what we learned from examining second-hand ATMs bought on
eBay. Section 5 presents our scientific analysis: what the crypto and security communities
should take away from this, how EMV can be made more robust, and how such failures can be
made less likely in future large-scale systems that employ cryptography for authentication and
authorisation. Finally in Section 6 we draw some conclusions.
2 Background
EMV (named after its original developers Europay, MasterCard and Visa) was developed in
the mid 1990s to tackle the developing threat of magnetic strip card counterfeiting, where
organised crime gangs with access to card manufacturing equipment produced cloned cards
using data from discarded receipts, or skimmed surreptitiously from legitimate cards, first at
point-of-sale (POS) and later at automated teller machines (ATMs). The payment terminal
2
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Figure 1: Fraud levels on UK-issued payments cards
executes the EMV protocol with the chip, which exchanges selected transaction data sealed
with a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) calculated using a symmetric key
stored in the card and shared with the bank which issued the card (the “issuer”). The idea is
that the bank should be able to detect a counterfeit card that does not contain this key, and
the physical tamper-resistance of the chip should prevent an attacker from extracting the key.
Many countries, including the UK, moved to authenticating cardholders with a PIN rather
than a signature at both POS and ATM, where previously PINs had only been used at ATMs.
The goal was to make it harder to use a stolen card. This simultaneous introduction gave rise
to the term “Chip and PIN” being commonly used in the English-speaking world to refer to
EMV. In layman’s terms, the chip protects against card counterfeiting, and the PIN against
stolen card abuse.
EMV did not cut fraud as its proponents predicted. While using counterfeit and stolen
cards did become more difficult, criminals adapted in two ways, as can be seen from Figure 1.
First, they moved to “card-not-present” transactions – Internet, mail-order, and phone-based
payments – which remained beyond the scope of EMV.
Second, they started making magnetic-strip clones of EMV cards. There had always been
some ATM “skimming” where crooks put devices on ATM throats to capture card data and
record PINs; and now that PINs were demanded everywhere and not just at ATMs, the oppor-
tunities for skimming increased hugely. The simultaneous deployment of EMV with magnetic
strip meant that fallback and backwards-compatibility features in EMV could be exploited; for
several years, all ATMs would still accept mag-strip cards, and even once this started to be
phased out in the UK for locally-issued cards, it was still possible to use mag-strip clones of UK
cards in ATMs in the USA. This is why, soon after the completion of the UK EMV roll-out in
2005, counterfeit fraud went up. Instead of entering PINs only at ATMs, customers were now
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entering their PIN in POS terminals, which are much easier to tamper with [6].
Total fraud levels were brought down following 2008 through improvements to back-end
fraud detection mechanisms which reject suspicious transactions; by more aggressive tactics
towards customers who dispute transactions; and by reducing the number of UK ATMs that
accept “fallback” magnetic-strip transactions on EMV-issued cards. Fallback fraud is now hard
enough to push the criminal community to more sophisticated smart-card-based attacks.
Prior research showed that it was possible to use a stolen EMV card in a POS device without
knowing the PIN. Given a suitable man-in-the-middle device, a crook can trick the terminal
into believing that the right PIN was entered, while the card thought it was authorising a
chip-and-signature transaction [14]; criminals have now gone on trial in France for exploiting
this “no pin” vulnerability [16].
However, the “no pin” vulnerability does not explain the large number of people who have
contacted the authors having been refused a refund for a fraudulent ATM transaction which
they adamantly deny having made. One such case was that of Alain Job who sued his bank
for a refund, but lost after the judge concluded that the customer’s card was probably used,
not a clone [10]. In that case, the bank destroyed the log files despite the fact that a dispute
was underway, contrary to Visa guidelines, and the judge warned that a court might not be so
tolerant of such behaviour in the future.
The number of such cases is unknown. The UK fraud figures quoted above only count
losses by banks and by merchants, not those for which customers are blamed; and since the
introduction of EMV, the banks have operated a “liability shift” as they describe it, which
means that when a transaction is disputed, then if a PIN was used the customer is held liable,
while if no PIN was used the transaction is charged back to the merchant. This may be ideal
from the banks’ viewpoint but is less so for their customers. The 2008/2009 British Crime
Survey [12] found that 44% of fraud victims didn’t get all their money back, despite both bank
guidelines and the European Payment Services Directive requiring that customers who have
not acted negligently or dishonestly be refunded. Of the 44% who were not fully refunded for
their losses, 55% lost between £25 and £499 ($40 to $790) and 32% lost £500 or more. So
there’s a large gap between the banks’ statistics and those from the crime survey. We believe
that the vulnerability we expose in this paper could explain some of it.
3 Overview of an ATM transaction
An EMV transaction consists of three phases:
1. card authentication in which card details are read and authenticated by the ATM or
POS terminal;
2. cardholder verification in which the person who presents the card is verified whether
by PIN or signature; and
3. transaction authorization in which the issuing bank decides whether the transaction
should proceed.
The principals are the card, the ATM and the issuer1. The process is illustrated in Figure 2.
The description below has been somewhat simplified, and represents typical UK transaction
flow. Other countries may differ slightly, but will be substantially similar.
1The bank that operates the ATM (the acquirer) and the network that links the issuer to the acquirer are
also involved in settlement, dispute resolution and assurance, but they do not participate in the authentication
protocol run other than to route messages, so have been omitted from the discussion in this section.
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cardATM
available applications (e.g Credit/Debit/ATM)
select file 1PAY.SYS.DDF01
select application/start transaction
signed records, Sig(signed records)
issuer
T = (amount, currency, date, TVR, nonce, ...)
ARQC = (ATC, IAD, MAC(T, ATC, IAD))
T, ARQC, encrypted PIN
ARPC, ARC
EMV command
SELECT/READ RECORD
SELECT/
GET PROCESSING OPTIONS
READ RECORD...
GENERATE AC
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE/
GENERATE AC
unsigned records
ARPC, ARC
TC = (ATC, IAD, MAC(ARC, T, ATC, IAD))
TC
Card authentication
Cardholder verification
Transaction authorization
protocol phase
Figure 2: Outline of an EMV transaction at ATM. Note that while the messages between card
and ATM have been verified, messages between issuer and ATM may vary depending on card
scheme rules
During card authentication, the card provides data records to the ATM, which include
the card number, start and expiry dates and which protocol options the card supports. The
card also provides a static RSA digital signature over selected records, which aims to prevent
crooks from fabricating cards from known or guessed account numbers. Some cards also provide
dynamic signature generation capabilities, known as “Dynamic Data Authentication” (DDA).
Following card authentication, cardholder verification proceeds by signature or PIN. In an
ATM transaction the card is not involved in this verification. The customer enters their PIN
on the PIN pad, where it is encrypted and returned to the card issuer for verification through
the ATM network.
Finally, transaction authorization is carried out. The ATM sends to the card various trans-
action fields: the amount, the currency, the date, the terminal verification results (TVR –
the results of various checks performed by the ATM), and a nonce (in EMV terminology, the
“unpredictable number” or UN). The card responds with an authorization request cryptogram
(ARQC), which is a cryptographic MAC calculated over the supplied data, together with some
card-provided data including the application transaction counter (ATC – a 16 bit number stored
by the card and incremented on each transaction) and the issuer application data (IAD – a
proprietary data field to carry information from the card to its issuer).
The ARQC is sent by the ATM to the issuer along with the encrypted PIN. The issuer
verifies the PIN and checks the ARQC by recalculating the MAC over the received data fields.
Additional checks include whether sufficient funds are available, that the card has not been
reported stolen, and risk-analysis software does not flag the transaction as suspicious. Then
the issuer returns to the ATM an authorization response code (ARC) and an authorization
response cryptogram (ARPC) destined for the card.
The ARC authorises the ATM to dispense cash, which in turn passes the ARC and ARPC
also to the card. The card verifies the ARPC (which is typically a MAC over the ARQC
exclusive-or’ed with the ARC), and returns an authenticated settlement record known as a
transaction certificate (TC), which may be sent to the issuer immediately, or some time later
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as part of a settlement process.
POS transactions proceed similarly, except that cardholder verification is usually performed
by sending the PIN to the card which checks it against a stored value. Whether the PIN is
verified locally or online makes no difference to the attack discussed here. If a POS device
generates unpredictable numbers that can in fact be predicted, then it too will be vulnerable
to a pre-play attack.
3.1 EMV pre-play protocol flaws
The card sends an ARQC to the ATM to prove that it is alive, present, and engaged in the
transaction. The ATM relies on the issuer to verify this and authorise the transaction. Simply
replaying an ARQC should not work, because a competent issuer prevents replay by rejecting
any transaction whose application transaction counter it has already seen. This prevents replay
attacks but cannot assure the issuer that the ARQC was computed today rather than yesterday.
To ensure freshness, a nonce is used – the unpredictable number (UN). This is a 32 bit field
generated by the ATM.
The first flaw is that the EMV protocol designers did not think through carefully enough
what is required for it to be “unpredictable”. The specifications and conformance testing
procedures simply require that four consecutive transactions performed by the terminal should
have unique unpredictable numbers [7, test 2CM.085.00]. Thus a rational implementer who
does not have the time to think through the consequences will probably prefer to use a counter
rather than a cryptographic random number generator (RNG); the latter would have a higher
probability of failing conformance testing (because of the birthday paradox).
The latest version of the EMV specification [8, Book 4, p57] offers some guidance as to
how to generate the unpredictable number, but previous versions left the algorithm entirely up
to implementers. Even the suggested construction (hash or exclusive-or of previous ARQCs,
transaction counter and time) would not be adequate for generating a truly unpredictable
number because the ARQCs would be zero if the ATM was rebooted and both the time and
transaction counter are predictable. Yet if the attacker can predict an “unpredictable number”
ahead of time, he can harvest ARQCs from a card one day and use them at the ATM the next.
The second flaw is that EMV does not include the identity of the terminal – a classic protocol
mistake. While the EMV framework can support this through designation in a list of fields to
be MACed in the ARQC (the CDOL1), the standard format developed by Visa (the version
10 cryptogram format [17]) requires only the terminal country code. The country in which the
attacker will use its skimmed data is trivial to predict in advance. The implication is that if
the attacker knows how to predict the UNs in a given make of ATM, he can harvest ARQCs
for use in any ATM of that type in a given country and at a given date in the future.
These protocol vulnerabilities result in a “pre-play” attack – authentication data are col-
lected at one moment in time, and played to one of a number of possible verifying parties at
some later time that is already determined when the data are harvested. The practical imple-
mentation is that a tampered terminal in a store collects card details and ARQCs as well as
the PIN from a victim for use later that day, or the following day, at ATMs of a given type.
For example, in the case of the ATM in Palma that started this line of research, the counter
rolls over every three minutes, so an attacker might ask a card in his store for twenty ARQCs
at points in the 15-bit counter’s cycle. On visiting the ATM he could use his attack card to
first calibrate the ATM’s counter, and then initiate transactions when the counter is expected
to be at a value for which he has a captured ARQC.
This is all very well in theory, but is it viable in practice? We decided to find out.
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4 Experimental Method and Results
Pre-play attacks against EMV have been discussed theoretically before, but for a real-world
attack to work, there are many practical challenges. In this section we describe our own
approach to them: surveying for an exploitable vulnerability, skimming data, and deploying
the attack. Each stage of the process must be completed by criminals with reasonable yield
and an acceptably low cost (including probability of being caught).
4.1 Identifying vulnerable ATMs
To identify vulnerable ATMs we took three approaches: analysis of log files, collection of UNs
in the field, and reverse engineering of ATMs.
4.1.1 Analysis of log files
We regularly investigate ATM withdrawals on behalf of customers in dispute with their banks.
In most cases the level of detail in logs provided by the bank is low, but in a minority of cases
detailed logs are handed over. The Palma case got us started on this research track, and we
have found one or two other cases of suspicious UNs in logs.
Following our responsible disclosure of this vulnerability to the banks and card brands, we
have offered to help them analyse their log data, but have so far received little or no feedback
at all. We suggest that anyone in dispute with a bank over ATM transactions where this
vulnerability might be an explanation should subpoena the bank’s logs for analysis.
We have also discussed the vulnerability with a large online services firm, but it turned out
that they do not retain records of the UN.
We are particularly interested in collecting UN data from Italy, which is the only country
of which we are aware where UNs are routinely printed on all customer receipts.
4.1.2 Active probing of ATMs
Even where ATM logs are available, the timestamps have an accuracy of only a second or so
rather than a millisecond, so perhaps only grossly non-random UN generation algorithms can
be identified. For both researchers and crooks, a better data collection approach is required.
This needs to be moderately covert as the public are aware of the problem of ATM skimming;
using primitive analysis tools repeatedly at an ATM may be a way to get arrested.
Therefore we constructed passive monitoring cards by adding a microcontroller to existing
EMV cards. (For ethical and prudential reasons we informed the Metropolitan Police that such
experiments were underway; we also consulted our local ethics process.) Care was taken to
ensure that the physical size of each card was not modified. The card remains a valid payment
card – the transaction flow proceeds as normal – so it should always be accepted. However,
it can be inserted into a variety of ATMs and POS devices without arousing suspicion. More
primitive approaches with trailing wires from the slot may cause problems in ATMs that hold
the card internally during reading. Figure 3 shows a payment card adapted with our circuitry.
Other possible monitoring equipment includes wireless relay cards transferring data to a card
outside, a wired card adapted to be compatible with ATM card slots, an overlaid shim glued atop
a thinned-down existing card, or an ultra-simple shim consisting simply of an antenna suitably
connected to the card data line (which we could observe using “TEMPEST” techniques).
In the case of POS terminals, sales assistants are often briefed to turn away during PIN
entry and avoid handling the customer card. Thus existing monitoring tools such as the Smart
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Figure 3: Passive monitoring card containing real EMV chip, with monitoring microcontroller
and flash storage
Card Detective [2] have been proven suitable for surreptitious use with a hidden wire running
up the experimenter’s sleeve. We have used this tool to analyze unpredictable numbers from a
POS terminal close to our offices, having the agreement of the POS owner.
For each ATM investigated we harvested between five and fifty unpredictable numbers by
performing repeated balance enquiries2 and then a small cash withdrawal. The use of balance
enquiries minimises the number of withdrawals on the card, as sudden repeated withdrawals
might trigger a fraud detection system and cause the card to be retained. Such cards cost a few
hundred pounds in component and labour costs so it is desirable to avoid their being captured
by ATMs.
4.1.3 Reverse engineering ATM code
We were aware that black-box analysis of terminals through looking at lists of UNs would not
tell the full story, so we acquired some ATMs for analysis. Figure 4 shows EMV-enabled NCR
and Hanco/Triton ATMs acquired via eBay for £100 each. Some of these had been in recent
service, and some were out of service, having only been used for development. Barnaby Jack [9]
describes how second-hand ATMs can be brought back into service easily by simply phoning
for a repairman.
Reverse engineering a functioning and captive ATM can combine the best of black-box
analysis with detailed work on the algorithms and also has the potential to expose weak pseudo-
random number generators such as the C rand() function whose output might look acceptable
to black-box analysis but is entirely predictable from a couple of recorded samples.
We have yet to confirm the UN generation algorithm in any of the ATMs. Analysis has
been complicated by the obsolete architectures and our work is ongoing. One ATM was running
OS/2 (see Figure 5(a)), and another on primitive hardware based on the Zilog Z180 CPU (see
Figure 5(c)). We identified the manufacturer of the EMV kernel from information inside the
ATM, and documentation on their website [3] indicates that the EMV kernel requires seeding
with an external source of randomness. Hardware analysis revealed presence of a dedicated
2It seems all transactions at ATM are authenticated by EMV protocol runs, but some with a zero withdrawal
amount.
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Figure 4: ATMs acquired for reverse-engineering
(a) Extracting disk image from NCR ATM
(b) Board with DES chip from Triton ATM
(c) CPU board from Triton ATM
Figure 5: Detail of hardware reverse engineering
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crypto chip implementing DES (see Figure 5(b)) and we theorise also containing a hardware
random or pseudo-random number source. Currently we are confident that each byte of the
unpredictable number is independently generated from an off-CPU resource. This would either
be the DES chip, a real-time clock (also present as a separate chip) or possibly the smart card
control unit which is a MagTek board accessed via a serial interface.
At the outset we believed that older, primitive platforms would be less likely to have a strong
source of randomness than modern platforms in all cases. However our broader research across
ATM and POS indicates a subtly different conclusion. Entirely modern platforms are likely
to call the typical OS resources for random number generation, which nowadays are relatively
strong. Meanwhile legacy platforms may have either strong or very weak randomness depending
on whether this issue was thought about by the designers at the time. Thirdly, legacy platforms
which have been ported to more modern environments are most likely to have weak randomness
as during the porting the random number generate custom call on the legacy platform is simply
mapped across to the easiest standard library call, such as the C rand() function. In summary
it is as important to consider the lineage of the ATM or POS software as it is to consider the
current platform when estimating likelihood of vulnerability.
4.2 Analysing the RNG
In Section 4.1.2 we described our own approaches to data collection. Using this approach we
collected data to analyse the RNGs in EMV devices in our local area. We performed more
than 1 000 transactions across 22 different ATMs and five POS terminals. We were successful
at locating ATMs with weak RNGs, but attackers need to go further and identify which specific
UNs are most likely to occur at a predictable future time. There are three broad classes of
ineffective RNG to consider:
• an obviously weak RNG algorithm. This includes using counters or clocks directly
as the UN, homegrown algorithms which combine obvious transaction data, and severe
programming errors which cause the state-space of a better algorithm to be limited (e.g.
casting down to the wrong integer size, or submitting four BCD coded random bytes
rather than four truly random bytes);
• a simple RNG with little or no seeding. There are many flavours, from a linear
congruential generator, through encryption of the clock, to more messy schemes where
we may find some fixed bits and some bits that cycle, or where a state machine starts
off appearing random but ends up in a tight loop cycling through just a small number
of values. From an embedded systems standpoint the typical options are the C standard
library time() and rand() calls, neither of which have unpredictable outputs from a
cryptographic point of view;
• an RNG that can be put into a predictable state. The simplest failure mode
is a strong RNG fed by a weak source of randomness that’s restarted on power-up, so
an attacker can force an outage or follow the replenishment crew. There are also sys-
tems drawing noise from an untrustworthy source, such as when an RNG uses data from
previous transactions. The attacker could insert a card which seeds known values, or
temporarily spoof the authorisation response from the bank, to push the RNG into a
predictable state.
Table 7(a) shows a selection of data collected from various ATMs falling broadly into the
first category of ineffective algorithms. ATM1 and ATM2 contain a typical characteristic, which
10
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SRC2 EXP6 SRC2 EXP6B
0 77028437 0 5D01BBCF
1 0D0AF8F9 1 760273FE
2 5C0E743C 2 730E5CE7
3 4500CE1A 3 380CA5E2
4 5F087130 4 580E9D1F
5 3E0CB21D 5 6805D0F5
6 6A05BAC3 6 530B6EF3
7 74057B71 7 4B0FE750
8 76031924 8 7B0F3323
9 390E8399 9 630166E1
Figure 6: Ten transaction sequences from a single ATM
we denote characteristic C, where the high bit and the third nibble of each UN are always set
to zero. 11 of 22 ATMs we looked at exhibited this characteristic. Our current levels of data
allow us to prove a non-uniform hypothesis on the data from most of these 11 ATMs with a
very good significance level. Table 6 shows two ten-transaction sequences from an ATM where
the characteristic was proven. However further analysis beyond confirming this characteristic
has not yielded statistically significant results yet. ATMs of wildly different ages and containing
different operating systems exhibited characteristic C, so we believe it to be an artifact of a
particular EMV kernel post-processing an RNG source rather than of the RNG source itself.
We suspect a number ATMs and POS will simply be using the C standard library rand()
function, and are undertaking analysis using techniques based on spectral tests. Such analysis
is complicated by the unknown levels of post-processing of the RNG: for example, we know in
the case of one EMV library that each byte of the unpredictable number is sampled separately
from the RNG – hence a modulo 256 or a type-cast is almost certainly post-processing the
output. Multiple calls to the RNG to produce one UN is on the one hand disadvantageous in
that fewer bits are available to detect state per sample, but making four consecutive calls in
a row for one UN reduces the potential interference from other services within an ATM also
making calls as part of the transaction process.
The third category could possibly be spotted from empirical analysis but are best detected
with reverse-engineering. In Table 7(b) we show a list of stronger consecutive unpredictable
numbers retrieved from a local POS terminal. Even in this case the first bit appears to remain
0, which might suggest the use of a signed integer.
Once UN generation is adequately understood, the attackers figure out what UNs to collect
in order to maximise the yield in the subsequent cash-out phase. The result is a target ATM
profile which is sent together with intended withdrawal amounts, country code and date to the
gang tasked with harvesting the ARQCs. Once a vulnerable ATM using the known RNG is
identified, and the attack flow can proceed further.
4.3 Harvesting the data
Given temporary access to an EMV card, whose holder is prepared to enter the PIN, and a
range of possible unpredictable numbers to be harvested, the crook programs his evil terminal
to read the static data from the card and call GENERATE AC to obtain an ARQC and TC for
11
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Counters Weak RNGs
ATM4 eb661db4 ATM1 690d4df2
ATM4 2cb6339b ATM1 69053549
ATM4 36a2963b ATM1 660341c7
ATM4 3d19ca14 ATM1 5e0fc8f2
ATM5 F1246E04 ATM2 6f0c2d04
ATM5 F1241354 ATM2 580fc7d6
ATM5 F1244328 ATM2 4906e840
ATM5 F1247348 ATM2 46099187
ATM3 650155D7
ATM3 7C0AF071
ATM3 7B021D0E
ATM3 1107CF7D
(a) From Various ATMs
Stronger RNGs
POS1 013A8CE2
POS1 01FB2C16
POS1 2A26982F
POS1 39EB1E19
POS1 293FBA89
POS1 49868033
(b) From local POS terminal
Figure 7: Categorised unpredictable numbers
each possible UN. This process could be performed by a dedicated device, or by a tampered
point of sale terminal, vending machine, or ATM. The criminal could tamper with an ATM or
point-of-sale terminal to perform these operations after (or instead of) a legitimate transaction.
Criminals have already shown the ability to tamper with equipment on an industrial scale and
with great sophistication.
For each card a set of ARQCs can be harvested, perhaps many dozens. The only limitation
is the time that the card can legitimately be left in a sabotaged POS while the customer believes
that the machine is waiting for authorisation. Thirty seconds is the standard authorisation time
limit; this might allow for more than 100 transactions to be skimmed.
4.4 Cashing out
To deploy the attack against an RNG which is a fast-moving counter such as we have observed,
the attacker needs to start the ATM transaction at precisely the right moment. For a counter
ticking hundreds or even thousands of times a second, it is impractical to synchronise merely
through timed insertion of the card into the machine. A special smart card is therefore required
which observes the counter and uses an on-board clock to decide when to initiate the relevant
parts of the protocol. Smart cards are allowed to delay processing responses almost indefinitely
using the request more time signal (i.e. sending byte 0x60), and timely insertion to the nearest
second will mean that the card should never need to delay more than a few hundred milliseconds.
This requires a card with an on-board clock which will keep working even in the absence of
external power. We are developing a 16 bit microcontroller with an on-board real-time clock
(RTC), powered by a capacitor when no power is supplied. The RTC is used to synchronise an
internal high resolution timer once the card is powered up, and waits the necessary amount of
time until the ATM arrives at the appropriate step in the EMV protocol where the unpredictable
number is sampled.
The feasibility of this attack is affected by the speed of the timer, the process by which
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Figure 8: Modified Chip and PIN terminal, playing Tetris
the ATM samples the timer, and the synchronisation resolution of the card. However there
are straightforward ways to relax the timing requirements. The attackers simply harvest a set
of transactions with consecutive unpredictable numbers, and the attack card makes its best
attempt at synchronisation. Once the card sees the unpredictable number returned by the
ATM it looks this up in an internal lookup table. If the UN is not present, the card can feign
failure. So if ten transactions are harvested from the skimmed card, the timing requirements
can perhaps be relaxed by a factor of ten as well.
In the case of ATMs employing stateful predictable pseudo-random RNGs, none of this
intricacy is necessary – the attacker simply samples the previous few unpredictable numbers
and can then predict the next one. In any case, synchronisation technology can be developed
and tested entirely offline against captive ATMs without any need to interact with the real
payment network.
4.5 Implementation and evaluation
We have constructed proof-of-concept implementations for all stages of the attack. As discussed
above, we modified a bank smart card for data collection to identify ATMs with poor UN
generation. To collect card data we have implemented a Python EMV terminal implementation
and modified an EMV terminal to collect card data, as shown in Figure 8. To carry out the
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attack we implemented a cloned card on the ZeitControl BasicCard platform.
We used test cards with known ARQC-generation keys (UDK) to prove the viability of the
attack at a protocol level. Our proof consists of an indistinguishability experiment; we take
two test cards A and B loaded with the same ARQC-generation keys, initialised with the same
ATC and handled identically. We use our skimming trace to harvest data from card A and
then program it on to a “pre-play card”. We then compare traces between the pre-play card
version of card A and the real card B, and observe that they are identical. This means that
at a protocol level it is impossible for the ATM to distinguish between the real and pre-play
cards. In detail the flow is as follows:
1. two transactions performed on card A
2. two transactions performed on card B
3. traces of transactions compared, GENERATE AC responses confirmed the same, proving
both cards have the same cryptographic keys and are generating the same cryptograms
(they are identical)
4. two ARQCs skimmed from card A
5. pre-play card programmed with data from data collected from card A
6. two transactions performed on card B
7. two transactions performed on pre-play card
8. traces of transaction compared and shown to be identical, confirming that pre-play card
is indistinguishable from card B
4.6 Limitations and Defences
The limitations of a pre-play attack are:
• The country of attack must be chosen in advance
• The dates of attack must be chosen in advance
• The amount must be chosen in advance
We assume that the unpredictable number is known ahead of time (either due to full pre-
diction of a pseudo-random RNG, or due to waiting until the appropriate moment to sample
a looping time-based counter). It is not necessary to know the terminal ID of the ATM, or
time of transaction, as these are rarely (if at all) requested by card and are not included in the
generation of the ARQC. The cloned card can be used in any vulnerable ATM which shares
the same country code.
The simplest fix is a cryptographically secure random number generator. The UN field is
only 32 bits, and so an attacker who could collect approximately 216 ARQCs from a card could
get a decent probability of success with 216 transactions at an ATM. This is not a realistic
concern as an EMV card should disable itself after 216 transactions, and carrying out 216
transactions at an ATM at 20 seconds each would not only take more than a day but should
rapidly propel the machine to the top of FICO’s watch list.
The problem here is that fixing the random number generator is a matter for acquiring
banks, ATM vendors, merchants and POS terminal suppliers, while the cost of fraud falls on
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the issuing banks and the customers. Hopefully this article will reduce the likelihood of risk
being dumped unfairly on customers, but what can an issuing bank do?
If an attacker requests many ARQCs from a card, the issuer may notice gaps in the ATC
sequence. Issuers should probably reject online transactions where the ATC is lower than the
highest ATC seen from that card, which would limit the attack window to the next genuine card
use. For offline transactions, however, this cannot be done because there might be re-ordering
of cryptograms.
One limitation of the skimming processes is that the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE call (which
happens during the transaction authorization, see Figure 2) cannot be made, as the ARPC
cannot be generated without the issuer’s involvement. This does not impair the card’s ability
to generate the ARQC (which happens before EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE), but it might allow
the attack to be detected by an issuer who examines the TC. The IAD field in the TC is not
covered by the EMV specification, but additional standards defined by Visa [17], commonly
implemented by cards, do go into more detail. A pair of bits in the IAD indicates whether
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE has been performed and whether it succeeded. Although this is not
suitable for preventing the attack (because the TC is only sent to the issuer once the ATM has
completed the transaction), it could allow detection later.
Another approach for increasing the difficulty of the attack is to force the card to commit
to the value of the ATC before the ATM presents the UN to the card. This is possible without
having to modify cards, because a mandatory feature of EMV is that the GET DATA command
retrieves the current ATC. If the pre-play card were able to exactly predict the value of the
UN in a transaction, being forced to choose an ATC would not affect the difficulty. However, it
would prevent the card from searching a list of available ARQCs and finding one that matches.
One set of non-defences are the public-key authentication features of EMV. The static digital
signature (Static Data Authentication – SDA) included on the card can be trivially copied to the
pre-play card. However, by examining records of transactions we discovered that the terminal
verification results (TVR) field sent to the card during transaction authorization indicates that
this digital signature was not verified. The decision not to check the digital signature could
have been made by ATM manufacturers to save the time needed to verify the signature on the
low-end CPUs in some ATMs (see Section 4.1.3), and the maintenance costs of updating the
root certificates, because counterfeit cards should be detected during transaction authorization.
Even the public-key challenge-response protocol of EMV (Dynamic Data Authentication
– DDA) would not adequately protect terminals from attack. If DDA were commonly used
by ATMs (or the attack is fielded at a point-of-sale terminal) the signature response to the
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command can be recorded and replayed just as the ARQC is. In our
POS terminal tests the unpredictable number sent by the terminal to the card in the INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE command is the same as for the GENERATE AC command. However this gets us
into the territory of what the acquiring bank might do, if forced to by changes in card scheme
rules or by legal precedents. We will return to this question in the next section.
5 Discussion
The potential vulnerability of EMV to a poor random number generator was discussed in the
abstract by Murdoch [13]. Markettos and Moore [11] additionally explored how otherwise secure
true random number generators could be manipulated to produce more deterministic output.
But this paper is the first work to show that poor random number generators exist in the
wild, that they have been implicated in fraud, how they can be exploited, and that the EMV
specification does not test adequately for this problem.
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The exploit scenario described in this paper might be viewed as a variant of the relay attack,
which was explored in the context of EMV by Drimer and Murdoch [5]. But there, the relay
attack required real-time bi-directional communication with the genuine card; the genuine card
had to be under the control of the attacker while the attack was taking place. This makes it
hard to deploy; the best attack we can think of is to have a false terminal such as a parking
meter to attract cardholders, communicating with a crook who waits with the connected false
card near an ATM. We do not know of this being deployed in practice (though we’ve heard
rumours). Another variant of the relay attack is the no-PIN attack where a man-in-the-middle
device tricks the terminal into accepting a transaction after the wrong PIN was entered; that
also works in real time. That has been deployed, and crooks have been prosecuted for it; but
so far the losses appear to of the order of a million Euros, and from one or two incidents. In
contrast, delays of days to weeks would be possible with the attack described in this paper,
therefore making it much more feasible to industrialise.
In other respects, the pre-play attack could be seen as a kind of card cloning. We have
already seen fake magnetic strip cards based on either the magnetic strip of the genuine card,
or the copy of the magnetic strip data stored on the chip of some EMV cards. Another approach
is the “YES-card” where the static data from a chip is copied to a cloned chip card. If the
transaction can be kept offline (e.g. by keeping it below the “floor limit”), the fact that such a
card cannot produce a valid ARQC or TC will not prevent the transaction, but as the YES-card
is responsible for verifying the PIN, it can be programmed to accepted any PIN. The pre-play
attack is more powerful in some respects as it works for online transactions, and less in others
as the transaction parameters must be known in advance. Crucially, the pre-play attack will
work in ATMs while a YES-card won’t (a typical YES-card attack involves buying cigarettes
for resale, which is less convenient than stealing cash directly).
One might imagine that much more fraud could be committed with a fully cloned card
containing a copy of the ARQC-generation keys than with a card containing pre-play data.
However even a full clone will have its own ATC which will start to diverge from that of the
real card and in due course be detectable. So a full cloning attack might be not that much
more powerful in practice than a pre-play attack.
5.1 Attack variants
Even if the UN generation algorithms are patched, a number of powerful attack variants may
make pre-play attacks viable for years to come.
• Malware. There are already numerous cases of malware-infected ATMs operating in
Eastern Europe and depending on the internal architecture of the ATM it may be easy
for such malware to sabotage the choice of UN. In fact one bank suggested to us that the
ATM that kicked off this whole research project may have been infected with malware.
• Supply chain attacks. Such attacks have already been seen against POS terminals in
the wild, and used to harvest magnetic strip data. So it is feasible that a criminal (or even
a state-level adversary) might sabotage the RNG deliberately, either to act predictably all
the time, or to enter a predictable mode when triggered via a covert channel. A suitably
sabotaged RNG would probably only be detected via reverse engineering or observation
of real world attacks.
• Collusive merchant. A merchant might maliciously modify their EMV stack to be
vulnerable, or inject replayed card data into the authorisation/settlement system. He
could take a cut from crooks who come to use cloned cards at their store, or just pre-play
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transactions directly. In the UK, there was a string of card cloning attacks on petrol
stations where a gang bribed store managers to look the other way when PIN pads were
tampered with and monitoring devices inserted into network connections; exactly what
you need to deploy a pre-play attack.
• Terminal cut-out. A variant is the terminal cut-out or bypass is where the transaction
stream between the merchant terminal and the acquirer is hacked to misreport the unpre-
dictable number when triggered by a particular signal (e.g. a particular account number
or a known ARQC). This transaction data stream is not normally considered sensitive
within the threat model and can be altered at will by merchant software. The attackers’
card performing the replay can then use any UN for which it has an ARQC, and the
true random UN made up by the terminal will never see the light of day. This is hard to
block: there is no provision in currently deployed EMV cards for the terminal to confirm
that its choice of UN was correctly included in the cryptographic MAC. The terminal
cut-out could be implemented in malware (and there’s evidence of bank botnets looking
for POS devices), or in a merchant’s back-end system (we have evidence of merchants
already tampering with transaction data to represent transactions as PIN-verified when
they were not, so as to shift liability).
• UN modification in the network. A man-in-the-middle device between a POS device
and the acquiring bank, perhaps at a network switch, would also be a good way to deploy
such an attack. This could be an attractive way to attack merchants that process high-
value transactions, such as jewelers or investment firms, who might guard their premises
and take care of their POS equipment yet still fall to a targeted attack. A pre-play
attack would be much harder to detect than old-fashioned attacks that just convert deny
authorisation messages into approve messages.
Perhaps the main takeaway message is that an attacker who can subvert a merchant’s
premises, get access to his terminal equipment (even before it is purchased), or get control of
his network connection, can do transactions that are indistinguishable from card cloning to
the bank that issued the EMV card – even if full card cloning is physically impossible. The
EMV attack surface is a bit bigger than one might think, especially once crooks learn how to
manipulate the protocol.
5.2 EMV protocol issues
The key shortcoming at the EMV protocol level is that the party depending upon freshness in
the protocol is not the party responsible for generating it. The issuing bank depends on the
merchant for transaction freshness. The merchant may not be incentivised to provide it, may
not be able to deliver it correctly due to lack of end-to-end authentication with the issuer, and
might even be collusive (directly or indirectly). This is somewhat outside the terms of reference
of traditional academic protocol analysis.
Recently there has been some formal analysis of EMV, but this flaw was not discovered [4].
One reason is that the UN was modelled as a fresh nonce, even though this is not required by
the EMV specification (this omission is understandable given that the actual specification of
the UN is buried on p.1498 in an annex to the EMV specifications, totalling over 4 000 pages).
The other is that the issuer and terminal are modelled as the same individual, whereas in reality
the relying party is the issuer and has only limited control over the terminal behaviour.
Let’s consider the EMV protocol in the traditional academic framework. The protocol might
be idealised as (where A is the ATM, B is the issuer, and C is the card):
17
Chip and Skim Bond, Choudary, Murdoch, Skorobogatov and Anderson
A −→ C : N,V, T
C −→ A : {N,V, T}KCB
A −→ B : {A, {N,V, T}KCB}KBA
B −→ A : {A,N}KBA
An analysis using the BAN logic [1] would note that KCB is a good key for communicating
between the card and the bank, so the bank knows that the card once said N , V and T ; if it
concludes that N is also fresh, then it will infer that the card said all this in the current epoch.
However N is not actually the card’s nonce NC, but the terminal’s nonce NT , and we can’t
infer anything once we formalise it this carefully.
It is well known that the assumptions used in the 1970s by the pioneers of authentication
were undermined by later “progress”. The Needham-Schroeder protocol [15], famously has a
“bug” in that the protocol can stall for an extended period of time between the third and fourth
messages, with the effect that old session keys once compromised cannot be revoked. Needham
and Schroeder defended themselves by pointing out that their paper had quite openly assumed
that principals executed the protocol faithfully; therefore such behaviour was a priori excluded
from their model. Our modern world of equipment that fails from time to time, and where life
is spiced by the occasional malicious insider, requires us to be more careful with revocation.
In exactly the same way, the deployment of a system like EMV across an ecosystem with
hundreds of vendors, thousands of banks, millions of merchants and billions of cards requires
us to be much more careful about who the principals are, and the incentives they have to
execute their tasks competently. Indeed, one of the new realities of the EMV world is that
merchants and banks may be hostile parties in the payment system, thanks to tussles over
payment transaction charges and chargebacks. There have been large lawsuits between major
retailers and payment networks, and we are aware of cases where merchants deliberately falsify
record data (e.g. by claiming that transactions were PIN-verified when they were not) so as to
push fraud costs to the bank and reduce chargebacks.
So if issuing banks cannot trust merchants to buy terminals from vendors who will implement
decent random number generators, what can be done? The protocol specialist will say that
randomness must be generated by the party that relies on it; so the terminal should request a
nonce from the issuing bank before commencing the transaction. This would take a long time
to implement and impose significant time and financial penalties as it requires an extra message
round trip for each authorisation.
A cheaper alternative might be a rule that, in the event of a transaction dispute, it would
be the responsibility of the acquiring bank to demonstrate that the unpredictable number was
properly generated. The terminal equipment might support audit in various ways, such as by
using a generator which encrypted an underlying sequence that is revealed after the fact, and
locked to the transaction log to establish time limits on possible pre-play tampering. However,
this would not be entirely trivial; secure storage of audit data in the terminal is a new problem
and creates new opportunities for attack.
5.3 Evidential issues in dispute
Viability of the pre-play attack has significant legal ramifications. It can no longer be taken for
granted that data in a logged transaction was harvested at the time and place claimed, which
undermines the reliability of evidence in both civil and criminal cases. To show that a given
transaction was made by a particular card, it is now necessary to show that the random number
generator on the ATM or POS was sound.
From the point of view of an issuing bank in dispute with a customer, this attack greatly
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complicates matters. The bank cannot just rely on its own log data – it must collect data
from a third party (the ATM operator) to prove that the ATM was not infected with malware;
that the random number generator was not vulnerable due to either design failure or a supply
chain attack; and that the logs at the acquirer match those kept at the terminal itself. A mere
one-off certification for a class of EMV kernel does not come close to discharging this burden.
There may be practical matters in incentivising the acquiring bank to cooperate with the issuer,
especially in international cases.
Under existing Visa guidelines, logs should be retained in case of dispute. Yet in recent cases
we have dealt with, logs were routinely destroyed after 90 or 180 days regardless of whether a
dispute was in progress. So the industry already cannot cope with dispute resolution based on
issuer logs; and given that some of the disputes we’re already seeing would require scrutiny of
acquirer and ATM operator systems, dispute resolution can only get harder. The only feasible
way forward is by getting the liability right. Banks which destroy evidence should become
automatically liable for the full sums in dispute, including costs. Above all, the burden of proof
must lie on the banks, not the customer. The Payment Services Directive already requires this,
yet dispute resolution bodies like the UK Financial Ombudsman Service routinely ignore the
law and find for banks who destroy evidence.
5.4 Industry Response
We disclosed this vulnerability to the major card schemes and to selected banks and payment
switches in early 2012. All parties acknowledged receipt and several contacted us to ask further
questions. The card schemes chose initially not to circulate the work, but after several weeks
a different contact did decide to circulate our report and our vulnerability disclosure report
received several thousand downloads. The vast majority of contacts refused to talk to us on-
the-record.
We received some informal responses: the extent and size of the problem was a surprise
to some, whereas others reported already being suspicious of the strength of unpredictable
numbers or even said others had been explicitly aware of the problem for a number of years. If
these assertions are true, it is further evidence that banks systematically suppress information
about known vulnerabilities, with the result that fraud victims continue to be denied refunds.
6 Conclusions
EMV is the main protocol used worldwide for card payments, being near universal in Europe, in
the process of adoption in Asia, and in its early stages in North America. It has been deployed
for ten years and over a billion cards are in issue. Yet it is only now starting to come under
proper scrutiny from academics, media and industry alike. Again and again, customers have
complained of fraud and been told by the banks that as EMV is secure, they must be mistaken
or lying when they dispute card transactions. Again and again, the banks have turned out to
be wrong. One vulnerability after another has been discovered and exploited by criminals, and
it has mostly been left to independent security researchers to find out what’s happening and
publicise it.
In this paper, we report the shocking fact that many ATMs and point-of-sale terminals have
seriously defective random number generators. These are often just counters, and in fact the
EMV specification encourages this by requiring only that four successive values of a terminal’s
“unpredictable number” have to be different for it to pass conformance testing. The result is
that a crook with transient access to a payment card (such as the programmer of a terminal
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in a Mafia-owned shop) can harvest authentication codes which enable a “clone” of the card to
be used later in ATMs and elsewhere.
The “pre-play attack” that we describe is not limited to terminals with defective random
number generators. Because of the lack of end-to-end transaction authentication, it is possible to
modify a transaction made with a precomputed authentication code, en route from the terminal
to the acquiring bank, to edit the “unpredictable number” to the value that was used in the
pre-computation. This means that as well as inserting a man-in-the-middle devices between
the payment card and the terminal, an attacker could insert one between the terminal and the
acquirer. It also means that malware in the terminal can attack the EMV protocol even if the
protocol itself is implemented in a tamper-resistant module that the malware cannot penetrate.
This may have implications for terminals based on mobile phones that rely on cryptography in
the SIM card.
This flaw challenges current thinking about authentication. Existing models of verification
don’t easily apply to a complex multi-stakeholder environment; indeed, EMV has already been
verified to be secure. We explained why such verifications don’t work and discussed the sort
of analysis that is required instead. Ultimately we feel that the tools needed to build robust
systems for millions of mutually mistrustful and occasionally hostile parties will involve game-
theoretic analysis as well as protocol-theoretic modelling. In addition, mechanisms for rolling
out fixes across networks with huge installed bases of cards and terminals, and strong external-
ities, will have to be much better than those we have at present, with incentives that put the
pain where it’s deserved and technical mechanisms that offer the prospect of remedial action
to the sufferers.
In the meantime, there is a structural governance failure that gives rise to systemic risk. Just
as the world’s bank regulators were gullible in the years up to 2008 in accepting the banking
industry’s assurances about its credit risk management, so also have regulators been credulous
in accepting industry assurances about operational risk management. In a multi-party world
where not even the largest card-issuing bank or acquirer or scheme operator has the power to
fix a problem unilaterally, we cannot continue to rely on a slow and complex negotiation process
between merchants, banks and vendors. It is time for bank regulators to take an interest. It’s
welcome that the US Federal Reserve is now paying attention, and time for European regulators
to follow suit.
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